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SPECIAL 301: AN EFFECTIVE TOOL AGAINST
THAILAND'S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATIONS
Preeti Sinha
Abstract: Special 301 of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act grants
the United States Trade Representative the authority to target countries that do not
adequately protect intellectual property rights. The USTR has been investigating and
negotiating with several countries, including Thailand, in an effort to improve
intellectual property protections for American products. As a result, Thailand has
instituted noteworthy changes in its copyright and patent laws. This Comment
recommends that the USTR continue to negotiate with Thailand, and that the USTR
continue to exert pressure on Thailand. This Comment also suggests that because
Thailand has taken steps to improve protection of intellectual property rights, the USTR
should refrain from imposing any trade sanctions under Special 301 against Thailand at
this time.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Intellectual property rights play an increasingly significant role in world
trade. 1 The problems associated with pirated goods have caused a divisive
debate between developing countries and industrialized countries. The
governments of industrialized countries are anxious to see stiffer intellectual
property laws enacted in developing countries to prevent the unauthorized
production and sale of products originally created in industrialized countries.
Business interests in industrialized countries also have a stake in increased
regulation, since researching and developing products can be costly. These
enterprises want to ensure they can recoup their initial costs, and obtain any
profits generated from their inventions and innovations. On the other hand,
developing countries are reluctant to channel funds toward enacting and
enforcing intellectual property legislation. Developing countries benefit by
permitting pirated goods to be sold in their domestic markets.
Recently, the United States has adopted the use of a bilateral trade
weapon to obtain increased intellectual property protections from its trading
partners. Under the aegis of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988,2 the U.S. threatens countries with a selected set of trade retaliation
1 See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New
Multilateralisn,76 Iowa L Rev 273, 275 (1991).
2 Trade Act of 1974 (Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act), as amended by the Trade Act of
1988, 19 USC §§ 2101-2495 (1988) ("1988 Trade Act").
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devices if countries do not ensure that intellectual property rights are being
protected. In response to warnings from the U.S., Thailand has increased its
enforcement of copyright laws and has improved its patent protections.
Thailand's actions fall short of what the U.S. believes is an adequate amount
of protection. Nonetheless, the 1988 Trade Act has had a measurable impact
on Thai policies regarding intellectual property rights.
This Comment will first explore why industrialized and developing
countries view intellectual property protection differently, and why
developing countries conclude that it is not in their interests to enact legal
protections. It next describes the enforcement procedures under the 1988
Trade Act generally, and their use against Thailand specifically. This
Comment will conclude that the 1988 Trade Act has proven to be an effective
means of vitalizing Thailand's commitment to intellectual property protection.
II.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTIONS: DIFFERING
BETwEEN DEVELOPING AND INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

IDEOLOGIES

Intellectual property issues necessarily play a role in the global
economy, because inventions and innovations cross national boundaries. The
debate continues, however, about the benefits and drawbacks that intellectual
Developing countries and
property protection poses for countries.
industrialized countries view intellectual property protection with strikingly
different perspectives. Because of this difference, intellectual property
protection has been characterized as a weapon used by the "haves" against
3
the "have nots."
A.

Developing Countries' Views

Developing countries believe that intellectual property protection
hinders their economic development because of the costs imposed. One of
the immediate economic effects of legal protections is to cause an increase in
domestic prices of patented goods. 4 The price increase results from market
monopolies held by patent holders. 5 Also, more royalty payments have to be
3 Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of IntellectualPropertyRightsand the GAM7: A View
From the South, 22 Vand JTransnatl L 243, 252 (1989).
4 Richard T. Rapp and Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs ofIntellectual Property Protection in
Developing Countries,24 JWorld Trade 75, 90 (1990).
5 Francis W. Rushing and Carole Ganz Brown, IntellectualPropertyRights in Science, Technology,
andEconomic Performanceat 27 (Westview Press, 1990).
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remitted to foreign firms because of an increased presence of patented
6
products.
Developing countries will also face other, more indirect costs if they
enforce intellectual property rights. Domestic firms in developing countries,7
which previously produced or sold pirated products, will be displaced.
Developing countries will also have to use their resources to establish an
effective intellectual property protection system,8 both to pass and to enforce
restrictive legislation. Additionally, developing countries, through public and
private means, will have to finance domestic research and development, since
they will not be able to copy patented products and processes. 9
Developing countries believe that advanced technology should be
furnished to them at a low cost to assist them in their general economic
development. 10 Instead of channeling their scarce financial resources toward
providing intellectual property protection, developing countries often prefer to
allow their domestic markets to remain unrestricted. The risks involved with
unprotected markets are minimal in contrast to the healthy return these
countries can expect by permitting piracy." Developing countries also
believe they can industrialize more rapidly if their domestic firms can copy
advanced technology rather than having to generate this technology on their
own. 12 For example, pharmaceutical products, chemical products and
computers are easier and less costly to copy than to invent. 13 Producing
14
original work in these areas requires a significant amount of investment.
B.

IndustrializedCountries' Views

Industrialized countries counter the preceding arguments by pointing
out the benefits that accrue to all nations when intellectual property
protections are adopted by both industrialized and developing countries.
Industrialized countries believe that if there are no incentives for individuals
and companies to market their inventions, then society as a whole will receive
6 R Michael Gadbaw and Timothy J. Richards, Intellectual Properly Rights: Global Consensus,
Conflict? at 256 (Westview Press, 1988).
Global
7
1d.
8 Id at 257.
9 Id at 256.
10 Rushing and Brown, IntellectualProperlyRights at 27 (cited in note 5).
11 Leaffer, 76 Iowa L Rev at 282 (cited in note 1).
12 Robert Weissman, PatentPlunder: Tripping the Third World, 11 Multinational Monitor 8 (1990).
13
f4 Id at 11.

Id.
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fewer new products and processes. 15 The original developers of new
products should be assured they have property rights in their inventions, and
should expect to derive some monetary reward, either from licensing fees or
from actual profits. 16

Also, those who provide capital to promote the

development of new products and processes should receive a fair return on
their investments to ensure that they continue to supply the required capital. 17
Industrialized countries also assert that intellectual property protection
does not lead to inordinately high prices, the supposed result of market
monopolization. The exclusivity identified with a patent remains for a limited
period of time, narrowly defined by the claims of the patent.' 8 This
restriction is not equivalent to monopoly power, for it is common to have
competition among patented products.19
III.

AN OVERVIEW OF SPECIAL 301 OF THE 1988 TRADE ACT

Developing and industrialized countries have attempted to bridge their
differences over intellectual property issues by participating in multilateral
forums, and by becoming signatories to international conventions. 2 0 The
United States has decided to take additional unilateral action against countries
which do not adequately protect intellectual property rights. In the last few
years, the 1988 Trade Act has become a primary means for the U.S. to target

such countries. 2 1 The relevant portion of the Act addressing intellectual
15 Rapp and Rozek, 24 J World Trade at 75 (cited in note 4).
16.1d at 85.
17 Rushing and Brown, IntellectualPropertyRights at 28 (cited in note 5). A spokesman from the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, based in the U.S., estimated that the cost of developing a new
medicine requires about $200 million, and that 12 years of research, development and registration are
required before it can be ascertained that the medicine is beneficial. Americans Push Again for Patent
Protection,Bangkok Post (Nov 12, 1992) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
18 Rapp and Rozek, 24 J World Trade at 91 (cited in note 4).
19 1d.
20 See e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for Signature Oct 30, 1947, 61 Stat
(5),(6), TIAS No 1700, 55 UNTS 187 (Article XX (d) of the GAT'IT, the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS), addresses intellectual property); Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, opened for signature Mar 20, 1883, as amended, 21 UST 1583, TIAS No 6923, 828
UNTS 305; Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 UST
1749, TIAS No 6932, 828 UNTS 3; The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, Sept 9, 1886, 828 UNTS 221 (1972) (as amended), 102 Stat 2853.
21 Acts, policies, and practices that are unreasonable under the Act include those which deny "fair
and equitable... provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights." 19 USC §
241 l(d)(3)(B)(i)(II)(1988). The 1988 Trade Act also targets countries which impede the establishment of
an enterprise, which promote export targeting practices, and which deny workers' rights. 19 USC §
2411(d)(3)(B).
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property rights is commonly referred to as "Special 301." Special 301 allows
the executive branch to institute retaliatory measures against countries that
continually allow the production and sale of pirated goods.
A.

THE ROLE OFTHE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

1.

StatutoryAuthority

The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is the
executive agency responsible for implementing Special 301 actions. Special
301 envisions a bilateral approach to moderating intellectual property trade
disputes between the U.S. and foreign governments. The USTR conducts
regular investigations and negotiates directly with the offending country.
Should the negotiations fail to achieve the desired goals under the Act, the
U.S. threatens to use, and eventually will institute, retaliatory trade measures.
Special 301, which is Section 301 of the 1988 Trade Act, is a revised
version of a comparable section of the prior Trade Act of 1974.22 The 1988
Trade-Act introduced two significant changes to the statutory enforcement
procedures of the 1974 Trade Act. One revision expanded the USTR's
authority, and the other imposed a time limit on implementing Section 301
action.
Under the 1974 Trade Act, the President determined whether
retaliatory action should be initiated against a country and, if action was
taken, the President decided which measures would be appropriate. The
1988 Trade Act transferred the authority to make these determinations from
the President to the USTR. 23 Additionally, the 1974 Trade Act had imposed
no time limits on when retaliatory actions had to be executed against
offending countries. 24 The 1988 Trade Act, however, requires the USTR to
implement Section 301 actions within thirty days after deciding to take such
action. 25
The USTR acts as a substantially independent actor in this capacity,
since it is subject only to the President's direction. 26 The USTR shoulders
primary responsibility for conducting investigations. The USTR is responsible
22 Trade Act of 1974, cited in note 2. Sections 301-306 of the 1974 Trade Act were rewritten and
signed into law as the 1988 Trade Act by former President Ronald Reagan on August 23, 1988. President
Reagan Signs Trade Bill, 36 Pat, Trademark & Copyright J 419 (1988).
23 H Conf Rep 100-576, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 551 (1988).
24
Id at 556.
25 19 USC § 2415(a)(1). See also H Conf Rep 100-576 at 556.
26 19 USC § 241 l(a)(1).
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for warning countries of the consequences of weak intellectual property
legislation and enforcement. If a country does not improve its protections, the
USTR can trigger retaliatory actions, including the withdrawal of trade
benefits or tariffs, or the imposition of import restrictions. 27 The USTR may
eliminate, or phase out, the
also form binding agreements with countries to
28
policies or practices which contravene the Act.
2.

Initiatingan Investigation

The first step in a Special 301 enforcement action is to determine
which countries are denying intellectual property protections within the
meaning of the 1988 Trade Act. The USTR conducts preliminary
investigations to obtain the requisite information which allow it to make this
determination. Investigations may be triggered either: 1) in response to a
petition filed by an "interested person," 29 or 2) 30because the USTR itself
decides to examine a suspected country's practices.
An "interested person" who wishes to lodge a complaint with the
USTR must submit a petition presenting evidence of a foreign government's
practice which supports pirating activities. The petition should include
information about the volume of trade affected, the manner in which the
practice is unreasonable under the Trade Act, and the specific intellectual
property right being violated. 3 1 The petition should also estimate the impact
on the petitioner's business and the overall effect on the United States'
domestic and international commerce. 32 The USTR is to determine whether
the allegations warrant an investigation no later than forty-five days after
33
receiving the petition.
The USTR may also take action on its own initiative, either as a
discretionary action or as a mandatory action. A discretionary action is
undertaken if34the USTR determines that action by the United States is
"appropriate."
However, the USTR is mandated to take action should it
27 19 USC § 241 1(c)(1)(A)-(B).
28 19 USC § 241 I(c)(1)(C).
29 19 USC § 2412(a). The term "interested person" includes, but is not limited to, domestic firms
and workers, representatives of consumer interests, United States product exporters, and any industrial
user of any goods or services that may be affected by the USTR's actions. 19 USC § 2411(d)(9).
30 19 USC § 2412 (b).
3115 CFR § 2006.1 (1992).
32 15 CFR § 2006.1(7)
33 19 USC § 2412(a)(2).
34 19 USC § 2411(b)(2).
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find that a foreign country's practices are "unjustifiable, and burdens or
restricts United States commerce. 3 The USTR arrives at its decisions after
it submits the annual National Trade Estimate Report 36 to the President and to
Congress. 37 Within thirty days of issuing the National Trade Estimate
Report, the USTR must formally identify which countries "deny adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights" 38 and must further identify
which of these countries shall be labeled "priority foreign countries. 3 9 The
USTR is required to publish its determinations in the Federal Register, along
with facts supporting its determinations. 40 If an investigation will not be
undertaken, the reasons why must be stated, and if an investigation will be
undertaken, a summary of any petitions submitted must be published in the
41
Federal Register.
3.

Negotiating

After an investigation has commenced, the USTR requests
consultations with the targeted foreign country. 42 If the U.S. and the targeted
foreign country are unable to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution, the
two countries may enter formal dispute settlement procedures. 43 At this
stage, a variety of situations may forestall or delay Special 301 action. For
example, the targeted country may be making progress in providing adequate
intellectual property protection. 44 Or, it may not be possible to resolve the
dispute using normal settlement procedures.4 5 After the USTR has
undertaken investigations, consultations and other intermediate steps, the
actions against an offending country if
USTR may institute retaliatory trade
46
such action is still found necessary.

35 19 usc § 241 1(a)(l)(B)(ii).
36 19 Usc § 2241(a)(I).
37 19 USC § 2241(b)(1). The USTR submits its report to the President, to the Committee on
Finance of the Senate, and to various committees ofthe House of Representatives.
38 19 USC § 2242(a)(1)(A).
39 19 USC § 2242(a)(2).
40 19 USC § 241 1(d)(3)(C)(ii).
41 19 USC § 2412(a)(3)-(4).
42 19 USC § 2413(a)(1).
43 19 USC § 2413(a)(2).
44 19 USC § 2414(a)(3)(B)(ii).
45 19 USC § 2414(a)(4).
46 19 USC § 2415(a)(1).
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A PRECURSOR TO USING SPECIAL 301 ACTIONS AGAINST THAILAND:
THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES

During the late 1980's, the U.S. vocalized its concern that piracy
appeared to be rampant in Thailand and in other Asian countries. 47 At that
time the U.S. announced its intention to deny tariff concessions to countries
which did not protect American copyrights, trademarks and patents. 48 To
keep their trade benefits from being withdrawn by the U.S., several countries
took measures to strengthen their intellectual property protections. Thailand,
although it was widely regarded as an egregious violator of intellectual
49
property rights, took only negligible steps to improve legal protections.
In particular, the U.S. was pressuring Thailand to strengthen its weak
copyright law. 50 Thailand did amend its copyright law to tighten control over
imitation designer clothes, books, music tapes and other goods. 51 However,
this amendment was insufficient to ward off continuing criticism by the U.S.
of Thailand's intellectual property protections.
As a result of its dissatisfaction, the U.S. discontinued trade benefits to
Thailand under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). On January
19, 1989, President Ronald Reagan declined to grant Thailand additional
duty-free treatment under the GSP program because Thailand was not
honoring U.S. intellectual property rights.52 The measure was predicted to
47 See e.g., US Cites Asian Piracy,NY Times D7 (Feb 15, 1988). Allen Wallis, then Under
Secretary for Economic Affairs of the State Department, expressed the U.S.'s views at an annual meeting
between the United States and the countries which form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). Besides Thailand, other offenders named by Wallis were the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and Brunei. Singapore was the only country not criticized because of the progress it was making in the
area of intellectual property rights protection. See also Fighting Trespassing on 'Intellectual Property';
U.S.Tries to Prevent Overseas Copying of Everything From Music to Microchips, Washington Post HI
(Dec 6, 1987). The article described Thailand as "acenter of film and music piracy." Additionally, then
USTR Clayton Yeutter downplayed the argument that allowing pirated goods in a developing country
could aid in the country's development. He stated "Idon't see how any nation in the world can defend
piracy4 8as a means of keeping consumer costs down."
See U.S. Plansto Defend its Patents,NY Times D6 (Apr 7, 1986).
49 See East Asian CountriesStrengthen Intellectual Property Protection, 32 Pat, Trademark &
Copyright J 38 (1986).
50 See ThailandExtends CopyrightProtection,Los Angeles Times part 4, at 3 (Apr 29, 1988).
51 Id.
52 54 Fed Reg 3573 (1989). The GSP program has two types of eligibility criteria. Under the
mandatory criteria, 19 USC § 2462(b), certain countries are rendered automatically ineligible for GSP
beneficiary status. Under the discretionary criteria, the President is to take certain factors into account
when designating a developing country as a beneficiary of GSP treatment. The President must consider
"the extent to which such country is providing adequate and effective means under its laws for foreign
nationals to secure, to exercise, and to enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property, including patents,
trademarks, and copyrights." 19 USC § 2462(c)(5).
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affect about $165 million of U.S. imports of Thai goods, including some
important Thai exports-wood furniture, mosaic ceramic floor tile, and
artificial flowers. 53 Reagan also warned that future GSP requests for Thai
favorably until Thailand improved its
products would not be viewed
54
intellectual property protections.

301

IMPLEMENTATION AGAINST THAILAND

V.

SPECIAL

A.

The USTR's Actions: 1989 to 1991

At approximately the same time that Thailand was denied beneficial
GSP treatment, Thailand was also being closely watched by the U.S. to see if
its practices measured up to the levels of intellectual property protection
55
In 1989 the USTR began its
required under the 1988 Trade Act.
56 In January of 1989, the
enforcement actions under the 1988 Trade Act.
USTR invited the public to comment on foreign countries which had policies
57
and practices that did not promote intellectual property protection.
Participants were58asked to describe the problems experienced and the effects
on U.S. industry.
In 1989, the USTR refrained from listing any countries as "priority
59
Instead of naming
foreign countries" within the meaning of Section 301.
"priority foreign countries," the USTR formed a "Watch List" and a "Priority
Watch List."60 The USTR identified twenty-five countries which it believed
6 1 Seventeen of
did not accord adequate -safeguards to intellectual property.
62 and eight others, the more serious
these were placed on the Watch List,
63 Thailand had been
violators, were placed on the Priority Watch List.
53 ThailandDenied Certain GSP Benefits for Weak Intellectual PropertyLaws, 37 Pat, Trademark
& Copyright J279, 280 (1989).
54 Fed Reg 3573 (1989).
55 USTR Fact Sheet for "Special 301" on Intellectual Property, reprinted in 38 Pat, Trademark &
131 (1989).
Copyni_'ght
5654JFed
Reg 2033 (1989).
57
Id.
58

1d.
59 38 Pat, Trademark & Copyright J at 131. See note 39.
60Id.
61 The USTR made its decisions in part by consulting with the interagency Trade Policy Staff
Committee, the Patent and Trademark Office, and the Copyright Office. Id.
62 These seventeen countries were Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id.
63 The eight countries were Brazil, India, Mexico, Peoples Republic of China, Republic of Korea,
Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and Thailand. Id.
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formally designated as a Priority Watch List country.6 4 Neither the Watch
List nor the Priority Watch List is mentioned in any of the statutory provisions
of Special 301. Rather, the lists are the USTR's own enhancements, allowing
the USTR to identify and negotiate with countries without immediately
having to resort to Special 301 procedures. 65
The USTR was not the only entity monitoring Thailand's actions. U.S.
industries were themselves concerned that their products were being
reproduced and manufactured in Thailand without proper authorization.
Consequently, petitions by two industry groups were filed with the USTR,
one alleging copyright violations and one complaining of patent
infringements. The industry petitions spurred separate investigations by the
USTR that occurred concurrently with the USTR's own general investigations
under Special 301.66 The events surrounding both industry petitions will be
examined below.
1.

The CopyrightIndustry'sPetition

On November 15, 1990, a coalition of U.S. copyright associations filed
a petition with the USTR's office as "interested persons" under Special 301.67
The coalition consisted of the International Intellectual Property Alliance
(IIPA), 68 the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), 69 and the

Motion Picture Export Association of America (MPEAA).70 Special 301
petitioners are required to describe the effects to their economic interests
which result from the offending country's practices. 71 The copyright coalition
claimed in its petition that the U.S. copyright industry lost between $70 and
$100 million in 1990 from unauthorized copies of copyrighted goods being
sold in Thailand. 72 On December 21, 1990, in response to the recording

64 The USTR established the following goals for enhancing intellectual property protection in
Thailand: improved and adequate patent protection for all classes of inventions, effective copyright
protection for U.S. works, including software, improved protection of foreign trademarks, and constructive
partici6'ation in multilateral intellectual property negotiations. Id.
Oz) Id.
66 See text accompanying footnotes 61-64, supra.
67 56 Fed Reg 67114 (1991).
68 The IIPA is composed of eight trade associations. The associations represent important segments
of the U.S. copyright industry. US Copyright IndustriesFile Unfair Trade Action Against Thailand, 41

Pat, Trademark & Copyright J 81 (1990).
69 The RIAA is a trade association representing the U.S. sound recording industry. Id.
70 The MPEAA is a trade association whose members are major producers and distributors of
entertainment programs for cinema, television, cable and home video. Id.
71 15 CFR § 2006.1 (1990).
72 56 Fed Reg 292 (1991).
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industry's petition, the USTR initiated an investigation of Thailand's copyright
enforcement practices. 73 In January74and November of 1991, the USTR
invited public comment on this matter.
Thailand took steps to stiffen its copyright protections, presumably in
response to the USTR's investigation. The Thai government amended its,
75
copyright law, which was to become effective in January 1992. The new
law extended protection to service marks and collective marks, and imposed
heavy penalties for infringement. 76 Steps were also being taken to improve
77
enforcement procedures to combat copyright piracy. The Thai government
raided establishments which sold pirated goods and seized evidence to
prosecute pirates. 78 Due to the effectiveness of the Thai government's
actions, the USTR terminated its Special 301 enforcement actions against
Thai copyright practices. 79 On December 20, 1991, the USTR officially
ended this particular investigation, which had been initiated in response to the
copyright coalition's petition.80
The PharmaceuticalIndustry's Petition

2.

On January 30, 1991, shortly over a month after the copyright coalition
had filed its petition with the USTR, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association (PMA) 8s also filed a petition against Thailand under Special 301
of the 1988 Trade Act.8 2 The PMA estimated that U.S. pharmaceutical
companies were losing $25 to $100 million annually due to patent piracy in
Thailand.8 3 Specifically, the PMA petition complained that Thailand lacked
product patent protection for pharmaceuticals, had patent terms of short
8 4 On
duration, and had excessively broad compulsory licensing provisions.
73 Id.
74
56 Fed Reg 67114 (199 1).
75 Thailand's Trademark Act was passed on September 6, 1991. New Thai TrademarkAct, 13 E
Rep 19 (1991).
Asian7Executive
6
1d.
77 56 Fed Reg 67114 (1991).
78.1d.
79

1d.
80 Id.
81 The PMA has twenty members in its organization which maintain affiliates in Thailand. PMA
Files § 301 ComplaintAgainst Thailand Over Drug PatentProtection,41 Pat, Trademark & Copyright J
315 (1991).
82 57 Fed Reg 5029 (1992).
83 PM4 Files§ 301 Complaint,41 Pat, Trademark & Copyright J at 315 (cited in note 81).
84 USTR Launches Section 301 Investigation of Thailand's PharmaceuticalPatent Lmv, 41 Pat,
Trademark & Copyright J430 (1991).
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March 15, 1991, in response to the PMA petition, the USTR undertook a
Special 301 investigation of Thailand's protection of pharmaceutical
products. 85 As of this writing, this investigation continues and has not yet
been terminated because patent protection for pharmaceutical products sold in
Thailand remains inadequate under the 1988 Trade Act.
B.

The USTR's Actions: 1991 to the Present

During the time the USTR was responding to the petitions filed by the
recording industry and the pharmaceutical industry, the USTR was also
continuing to monitor countries on its own Watch List and Priority Watch
List. On January 11, 1991, the USTR requested public comments to once
again assist it in the identification of "priority foreign countries." 86 On April
26, 1991, the USTR named three countries as the worst offenders of
intellectual property violations, and, for the first time, placed them on the
"priority foreign country" list within the meaning of Special 301.87
Previously, the USTR had placed countries on its Watch List and Priority
Watch List, and had refrained from formally designating countries as "priority
foreign countries." Now, Thailand, India and the People's Republic of China
88
are officially marked as "priority foreign countries."
On January 23, 1992, the USTR announced once again it was
soliciting public comment on the identification of "priority foreign
countries." 89 On February 11, 1992, the USTR announced it was seeking
public comment in particular on the adequacy of patent protection in
Thailand. 90
1.

Thailand'sAmendment of its PatentLaws

Thailand's designation as a "priority foreign country" in 1991 and the
USTR's continuing investigations in 1992 appeared to have goaded the Thai
government into action. On February 27, 1992, the Thai National Legislative
Assembly passed a bill that amended its patent laws in several critical
85 57 Fed Reg 5029 (1992).
86 56 Fed Reg 1214 (1991).
87 56 Fed Reg 2006 (1991).

88 Id. This listing followed a recommendation by President Bush's Economic Policy Council that
all three be listed for violating American copyrights and patents. China, India, and Thailand Named in
First 'PriorityForeign Country'List,42 Pat, Trademark & Copyright J 7, 8 (1991).
89 57 Fed Reg 2795 (1992).
90 57 Fed Reg 5029 (1992).
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respects. The new patent laws provide protection to many more kinds of
products than the previous laws did. 91 Patent protection was expanded to
include pharmaceutical products, active pharmaceutical ingredients, food,
92
beverages, farm machinery and bio-technological inventions. None of these
items were available for patent protection before these amendments were
passed.

93

Another expansive aspect of the legislation is that the period of
protection has been extended to twenty years from the date the patent
95
application is filed, 94 instead of fifteen years under the previous laws. The
new laws also grant additional protection to patent holders. Patentees will
receive some patent protection before the actual granting of the patent if the
patent application has already been published. 96 Patentees will97also receive,
for the first time, exclusive rights to imported patented products.
2.

The USTR's Discontent With the Amendments

However, the USTR was not content with the changes Thailand
instituted in its patent laws. USTR Carla Hills claimed the new laws were
"deficient in several critical respects.1 98 One of the alleged defects of the
amended patent laws is that the laws do not provide protection for existing
patented products. 99 Also, the USTR was displeased with the functions of the
100
new Pharmaceutical Patent Board formed under the Thai bill. Under the
new laws, companies will have to submit cost and pricing information to the
Patent Board, and severe penalties will be imposed on companies that do not
comply. 10 1 The Board is authorized to compare the prices of patented
91 The bill was opposed by the Public Health Ministry, which has the support of local Thai drug
companies, physicians and pharmacist associations. The provision generating the most controversy was
one in which the law would be effective 180 days after passage by the Thai Assembly. The Public Health
Ministry and its supporters were insisting that the grace period be expanded to four years, to enable the
Thai pharmaceutical industry to adjust to the changed conditions. ThailandAttempts to Approve Patent
Bill to92Head OffFuture U.S. Trade Sanctions, 9 Pat, Trademark & Copyright J 64 (1992).
Amendments to PatentLaw Will Take Effect in September,Pat, Trademark & Copyright L Daily
1992).
(July 29,
93
Ild.
941d.
95 ld.
961Id.
971Id.
98 USTR Finds Against Thailand on Patents,Delays Action Until After Thai Election, Intl Trade
Daily (Mar 17, 1992).
9 Amendments to Thai PatentAct, 14 E Asian Executive Rep, 8 (1992).
10 0
Id.
101 USTR FindsAgainst Thailand on Patents,DelaysAction Until After Thai Election, Intl Trade
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products with those of non-patented products, and it may report its
information to the government's Price-Fixing and Antimonopoly
Committee.' 02 The USTR claimed this process would be a "disincentive" for
03
companies to obtain patent protection. 1
Because of the deficiencies of Thailand's amendments, on March 13,
1992, USTR Carla Hills announced that Thailand had. still failed to ensure
satisfactory protection of U.S. patents on pharmaceutical products.
Nonetheless, the USTR was reluctant to institute any retaliatory trade
measures until the new government was formed in Thailand. 0 4 On April 29,
1992, the USTR once again identified Thailand, along with India and Taiwan
as "priority foreign countries."' 1 5 Taiwan was new to the list, and since
Thailand and India were already on the "priority foreign country list," the
USTR stated that it would continue to consult with those countries about
06
intellectual property issues without initiating new investigations. 1
3.

The Problem of Thailands ChangingGovernments

Since March of 1992, when the USTR initially decided to await the
formation of the new Thai government before instituting retaliatory action,
Thailand has had three different governments. The most recent government
(as of this writing) was established on October 1, 1992.107 On October 16,
1992, the USTR reiterated that it would not institute retaliatory trade actions
10 8
against Thailand in response to Thailand's unreasonable patent practices.
Again, Thailand's turbulent political climate was the reason cited for the
USTR's delay. The USTR stated that the change in governments had
"significantly hindered" the USTR's negotiations efforts.' 09
The recurring change in governments, however, has not deterred the
USTR in its informal negotiations efforts. USTR Carla Hills has instructed
Special 301 negotiators to meet with officials from the current government (as
of this writing) to resolve intellectual property disputes. 1 0
Daily (Mar 17, 1992).
102 Amendments to Thai PatentAct, 14 E Asian Executive Rep 8 (1992).
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ANALYSIS OF SPECIAL 301's EFFECTIVENESS

The problem of patented products being illegally copied and sold in
foreign markets continues to plague U.S. industries. Each year, the lack of
protection for copyrights, trademarks and patents costs U.S. industries
billions of dollars. 111 Because intellectual property violations continue to be
a significant problem in many countries, Special 301 legislation should
continue to be implemented. Special 301 has several important features, as
described below.
A.

Benefits ofSpecial 301's Statutory Requirements

First, Special 301 delineates time periods in which actions must be
taken by the USTR. This ensures that enforcement actions against countries
are not significantly delayed. The USTR has to follow deadlines by which it
must respond to complaints, launch investigations, and make concrete
determinations about the progress countries are making. This continual
monitoring exerts time pressure on the targeted countries, encouraging them
to institute reforms promptly. Also, Special 301 ensures regular reviews of
the progress countries are making. Through these reviews, the USTR can see
to it that once a country begins to locate and prosecute producers and sellers
of pirated goods, the country does not ease up on its enforcement later.
Within the U.S., Special 301 addresses domestic industries' concerns.
The petition process by "interested persons" allows U.S. industries to
communicate directly with the USTR. Industries also assist the USTR by
producing evidence to support their petitions. Their evidence describes how
domestic industries are economically affected by foreign piracy, and allows
the USTR to present specific demands in its negotiations with other countries.
Special 301 legislation is intended to threaten countries with trade
sanctions if adequate intellectual property protections are not forthcoming.
However, in its actual implementation of Section 301, the USTR aims to be
diplomatic and not threatening. As exemplified by its treatment of Thailand,
the USTR has not hastily marked countries as "priority foreign countries."
Copyright L Daily (Oct 15, 1992).
11lndustry Callsfor Stiffer Enforcement of Anti-Counterfeiting Laws Abroad, 44 Pat, Trademark
& Copyright J 585 (1992). Intellectual property groups were testifying at a hearingheld by the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks on September 29, 1992. One spokesman
for the International Intellectual Property Alliance reported that 95 percent of the videos sold in Thailand
were pirated. IndustryCalls ForStiffer Enforcement ofAnti-Counterfeiting Laws Abroad, Pat, Trademark
& Copyright L Daily (Sept 30, 1992).
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Instead, the USTR tries to ensure that it has a substantial basis for designating
a country as a "priority foreign country." The formation of the Watch List
and Priority Watch List have been useful intermediate steps to encourage
negotiations and bilateral talks between the U.S. and targeted countries.
Special 301 is also effective because it lists specific enforcement
mechanisms available to the USTR. The trade weapons, 1 2 enumerated in the
statute, can cause great economic loss for the targeted country, and serve as a
financial disincentive to permitting piracy. Countries are aware that if they do
not attempt to control piracy, trade sanctions will eventually be levied. If the
USTR does have to resort to using retaliatory trade weapons against a
country, the country will have to respond with positive action if it wishes to
renew its beneficial trade status.
B.

Limiting the Scope andIntensity

The scope and intensity of the USTR's actions is one of the more
debatable aspects of Special 301. Expanding the scope of Special 301 would
certainly benefit U.S. industries, which have an economic interest in
combating piracy problems in all countries. U.S. intellectual property
alliances have recommended additions to the countries named on the USTR's
Priority Watch List," 3 and the Watch List. 114 This would result in additional
countries being investigated and facing possible retaliatory trade action under
Special 301. However, if such an expansion were deemed necessary, funding
for the USTR's efforts would have to be increased. Since the Office of the
USTR is an executive agency, President Clinton and his staff would most
likely be the persons who would decide whether the USTR's efforts warrant
additional funding.
The intensity of the actions undertaken by the USTR will depend on
the circumstances surrounding each targeted country. Special 301 has proven
to be an effective tool in encouraging Thailand to take measures to combat
piracy. In the last few years, Thailand has strengthened its enforcement of
both copyright and patent rights. Still, as evinced by the fact that Thailand
has been designated as a "priority foreign country," there remain additional
112 19 USC 2411(c)(1)(A)-(B).
113
They suggest adding Australia, Egypt, Germany, Italy, Korea, Paraguay, Turkey, and the United

Arab Emirates. JIPA, PMA Submit Lists of Nations They Want Added to USTR Lists, Pat, Trademark &
L Daily (Apr 21, 1992).
Copyright
4
The countries suggested are Brazil, China, Cyprus, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Russia and
the Commonwealth of Independent States, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Id.
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measures that Thailand must take before the USTR is fully satisfied with
Thailand's performance. Nonetheless, Thailand has taken noteworthy steps to
increase its intellectual property protections.
C.

The Thai Government's Efforts

The Thai Government did enact significant amendments to its laws in
February of 1992.115 The Thai National Legislative Assembly adopted
internationally recognized rules, such as those included in the Paris
Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the WIPO model Law, and the
TRIPS Agreement of the GATT.II 6 Yet, the USTR was not satisfied with the
Thai legislation, and it did not approve of the functions delegated to the newly
formed Pharmaceutical Patent Board. However, the formation of the Patent
patented
Board is an understandable safeguard against Thailand's fear that 117
overpriced.
be
will
and
products will have monopolies on the market
The Thai government has been trying to improve its enforcement
actions against intellectual property violators. The Thai police have been
raiding the larger audio and video targets. 1 8 They also began seizing
equipment used in illegal copying.11 9 The U.S. should recognize that
developing countries do not have the administrative enforcement mechanisms
in place that many industrialized countries have. Enforcement of intellectual
property rights is subject almost entirely to the political processes in
20
developing countries. 1
The most recent Thai government has indicated its willingness to
continue enacting stiffer intellectual property legislation and enforcement.
Thailand's chairman of the International Economic Relations Policy
Committee has stated that Thailand wants to avoid being sanctioned with
further trade barriers. 12 1 The same government official stated that there was a
would amend its laws in both the
strong possibility that the government
122
areas.
copyright
pharmaceutical and
115 See notes 88-92 with accompanying text.
116 See Amendments to ThaiAct, 14 E Asian Executive Rep 8 (1992).
117 See note 4.
118 See USTR's Assessment of Thai Trade Barriers,Bangkok Post (Apr 2, 1992) (LEXIS, Nexis
libray, Omni file).
19 Id.
120 See U.S.Trade Threats Spur Asian Laws on IntellectualProperty,National L J (July 13, 1992).
121 See Commerce to Preparefor GSP Talks With US Govt, Bangkok Post (Nov 14, 1992) (LEXIS,
library, Omni file).
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CONCLUSION

The USTR should refrain from intensifying sanctions against Thailand
at this time. Thailand has been responding positively to the USTR's demands
thus far, and will probably continue to improve its legislation and enforcement
activities. The USTR has taken into account the recent political instability of
successive Thai governments, and, as a consequence, has delayed retaliatory
action. But it is also important that the USTR recognize that, as a developing
country, Thailand lacks a strong administrative system which can effectively
monitor and prosecute intellectual property violators. Additionally, Thailand
will be reluctant to grant complete freedom of sale of patented products,
fearing that monopolization by such products will result in substantial price
increases. Thus, the USTR should continue to implement Special 301 actions
against Thailand, but should refrain from triggering retaliatory trade devices.

